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We develop a model that fleshes out, extends, and modifies existing models of reference  
dependent preferences and loss aversion while accomodating most of the evidence motivating 
these models. Our approach makes reference-dependent theory more broadly applicable by 
avoiding some of the ways that prevailing models—if applied literally and without ancillary 
assumptions—make variously weak and incorrect predictions. Our model combines the 
reference-dependent gain-loss utility with standard economic “consumption utility” and clarifies 
the relationship between the two. Most importantly, we posit that a person’s reference point is 
her recent expectations about outcomes (rather than the status quo), and assume that behavior 
accords to a personal equilibrium: The person maximizes utility given her rational expectations 
about outcomes, where these expectations depend on her own anticipated behavior. We apply 
our theory to consumer behavior, and emphasize that a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good 
is endogenously determined by the market distribution of prices and how she expects to respond 
to these prices. Because a buyer’s willingness to buy depends on whether she anticipates buying 
the good, for a range of market prices there are multiple personal equilibria. This multiplicity 
disappears when the consumer is sufficiently uncertain about the price she will  face. Because 
paying more than she anticipated induces a sense of loss in the buyer, the  lower the prices at 
which she expects to buy the lower will be her willingness to pay.  In some situations, a known 
stochastic decrease in prices can even lower the quantity demanded. 
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How a person assesses the outcome of a choice is often determined as much by its contrast with a
reference point as by an intrinsic preference for the outcome itself. In experimental and empirical
investigations, the most noticeable manifestation of such reference-dependent preferences is loss
aversion: Losses resonate more than same-sized gains. In purchasing decisions, the minimal ac-
ceptable selling price for an object is typically higher than the maximum price at which people are
willing to buy the same object.1 This “endowment eﬀect” occurs partly because subjects construe
selling the object as a loss, and consider buying it as (merely) a gain. And as emphasized in the
ﬁrst prominent formal model of reference-dependent preferences, Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
the most signiﬁcant source of risk aversion over modest stakes is aversion to losses.
It is becoming widely recognized that reference dependence and loss aversion may have im-
portant economic consequences, and researchers have begun to apply these ideas in a handful of
economic situations.2 Yet existing models are better suited to explaining experimental data, or to
applying them in a speciﬁc context, rather than to systematically integrating them into economic
theory. If applied literally and without ancillary assumptions, these models also make variously
bad or weak predictions in many relevant potential applications. In this paper we build on the
essential intuitions in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and subsequent models of reference depen-
dence, but ﬂesh out, extend, and modify these models to build a realistic and more general theory
of reference-dependent preferences that can be systematically applied to a wide array of economic
settings. We demonstrate such applicability by establishing some strong predictions of the model
in the analysis of consumer purchasing behavior.
We present the basic framework in Section 2. A person’s utility depends not only on con-
sumption, c, as in the standard neoclassical formulation, but also on a “reference” consumption
level, r. Both c and r are K-dimensional vectors. To construct the utility function u(c|r), we
begin with an intrinsic “consumption utility” m(c) that is independent of the reference level, and
that can be interpreted as corresponding to the classical notion of outcome-based utility. Overall
1See Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler (1990, 1991).
2See, e.g., Benartzi and Thaler (1995) Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), and Genesove and Mayer (2001).
1utility is given by u(c|r) ≡ m(c)+n(c|r), where n(c|r) is gain-loss utility. We assume both con-





k nk(ck|rk). The person’s “gain-loss utility” in dimension k, nk(ck|rk), depends
solely, through a “universal gain-loss function” µ, on how consumption utility in that dimen-
sion compares to what the person could have achieved with the reference consumption level:
nk(ck|rk) ≡ µ(mk(ck) − mk(rk)). We posit that µ satisﬁes the properties of Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s (1979) value function, including a concave kink at zero that captures loss aversion.
While tying the twotogether so tightlyis likely to lead to incorrect predictions in some situation,
we feel that basing gain-loss utility on consumption utility is roughly correct—and is an important
novel restriction for a reference-dependent model to make sensible and strong predictions in many
economic contexts.3 By tying gain-loss utility in diﬀerent dimensions to the consumption utility
in those dimensions, our model predicts for instance that people are less bothered by risk in goods
of lower consumption value than by risk in dimensions of greater consumption value. And by
adding consumption utility to the decisionmaker’s utility function, it both replicates the predictions
of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory value function under typical situations, where the
consumption values of gains and losses are likely to be similar, and improves predictions in cases
where the value function over consumption levels clearly does not apply. If a person’s reference
point in water is one quart below the survival level, for instance, her observed value function would
surely not exhibit loss aversion: a one-quart increase in water endowment would be assessed as
more valuable than a one-quart decrease would be assessed as detrimental.
Since behavior depends on the reference level, the predictions of reference-dependent theories
in most settings depend crucially on what this reference level is assumed to be. Yet theoretical and
empirical research on this issue is far less extensive than research on how people react to departures
from a given reference point. A broadly realistic, but general and precise, theory of reference-point
determination would seem useful. For a variety of reasons detailed in Section 3, we posit that a
person’s reference point is her recent beliefs about future outcomes. An employee who conﬁdently
3Our formulation of this relationship relies on the assumption that consumption utility itself is separable across
dimensions. While the model could be generalized, we argue in Section 5 that such separability is in fact conceptually
compelling once consumption dimensions are appropriately chosen.
2expects a 10% pay raise might assess a raise of only 5% as a loss. And if expecting Johnny Depp
to star in a movie, it is a painful loss if he has merely a cameo.
While existing experimental evidence is generally interpreted in terms of the reference point
being the endowment or status quo, we feel that virtually all of this evidence can also be interpreted
in terms of expectations—for the simple reason that in the contexts studied people plausibly expect
to keep the status quo. Among the array of situations classically studied by economists, however,
there are many cases where people very much do not expect to keep the status quo. In most
such cases, we believe equating the reference point with expectations will typically make better
predictions. Eating meals and enjoying entertainment and many other activities are not part of a
person’s endowment prior to consumption; status-quo models are then seemingly forced to assign
the same reference point of zero in all cases, so that irrespective of expectations allsuch consumption
would be assessed as gains. And more fundamentally, most of the market activity that economists
study is between buyers who hope and expect to lose money and gain items and sellers who hope
and expect to gain money and lose items. While our analysis below focuses on some dramatic
implications of loss aversion and reference dependence in market settings, it also implies that it
is incorrect to extrapolate endowment-eﬀect experiments by predicting market participants assess
their planned trades in terms of losses. From the perspective of our model, when a consumer
goes shopping, she does not assess carrying out planned purchases as involving a loss; rather, it
is failures to carry out intended purchases, or paying more than expected, that are assessed as
involving losses.
Saying that the reference point is expectations means that our predictions are driven in a large
part by our theory of how expectations are formed. We complete our model by assuming rational
expectations, and, along the lines of K˝ oszegi (2001, 2003), deﬁning a “personal equilibrium” as a
situation where the stochastic outcome implied by optimal behavior conditional on expectations
coincides with expectations. While our approach takes analysisto its rational-expectationsextreme,
it provides a disciplined way of capturing the realistic assumption that people typically have some
ability to predict their own behavior.4
4Our designation of expectations as the reference point makes another limitation of most previous models more
apparent. Because an agent’s beliefs are typically stochastic, applying reference-dependent utility theory must allow
3In Section 4 we analyze consumer demand. Positing expectations as the reference point not
only avoids the mis-extrapolation of endowment-eﬀect ﬁndings to actual makets, it makes a series
of strong predictions all centering around a central implication: A buyer’s willingness to pay for a
good does not reﬂect merely her intrinsic valuation for the good; rather, it also depends strongly on
beliefs about whether she is going to buy it and how much she is going to pay for it. As such, our
model predicts that consumer preferences may be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by market conditions. In
this sense, it adds to other recent research suggesting that preferences cannot be taken as exogenous
in studying market outcomes.5 In addition, our model provides structure for investigating how and
when the market conditions aﬀect preferences.
One striking implication of the endogenous determination of consumer valuation is the possi-
bility of multiple personal equilibria. Intuitively, if a customer expects to buy a pair of shoes, she
construes coming home without a pair as a (strongly felt) loss of shoes not acquired and a (less
important) gain of money not paid, making her inclined towards buying. Conversely, if she expects
not to buy, she experiences giving up money as a loss, and getting shoes as merely a gain, making
her disinclined to buy. For a range of market price levels, this generates multiple equilibria.
A more interesting implication of the endogenous determination of consumer valuation is that
the buyer’s reservation price depends on the distribution of prices she is facing. An extreme
manifestation of this dependence is that a known stochastic downward shift in prices can lower
a consumer’s demand for a good. There are always prices pH and pL <p H, for example, such
that if a consumer knows that the price is pH, it is an equilibrium for her to buy for sure; but
if she assigns equal probability to each of the two prices, the unique equilibrium is never to buy.
Intuitively, anticipation of the possibility of buying at a low price makes paying the high one feel
for risky reference points. In our model, therefore, utility depends both on the probability distribution over consump-
tion levels F(c) and a reference point G(r) that is itself a probability distribution. We assume that in comparing a
given outcome c to the reference point G, the agent compares c to all r possible under G, and takes the average of
these gain and loss sensations.
5See, e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003), on how preferences that appear coherent and consistent may in
fact be relatively arbitrary, and Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), who discuss some implications for consumption behavior
of assuming that preferences depend on choice sets. Like our model, these theories say that the set of opportunities
induced by markets will inﬂuence preferences.
4like a loss. This “comparison eﬀect” can make a consumer unwilling to buy at the high price. But
if she anticipates not buying at the high price, she becomes less attached to the idea of buying, and
does not buy at the low price, either.6 More generally, since high prices are always subject to an
unfavorable comparison with lower prices, lowering prices at which the consumer would otherwise
have bought exerts a downward pressure on her reservation price.




H such that if the price is p0
H with certainty, it is an equilibrium for the consumer not to buy,
but if the price is uncertain, it is the unique equilibrium for her to buy at both prices. Intuitively,
p0
L is so low that the consumer would buy at that price in any equilibrium. But once she anticipates
buying with some probability, she feels more of a loss if she does not buy. This “attachment eﬀect,”
a possible motive behind some promotions and sales techniques, induces her to buy at price p0
H as
well. Section 4 generalizes these eﬀects on the consumer’s reservation price, and derives a number
of other properties of personal equilibrium in consumer markets.
For most of the paper we follow the common interpretation in the literature that people assess
gains and losses separately in each of the goods being considered. As we argue in Section 5, however,
a more accurate view is that people assess gains and losses in dimensions of hedonic experience
that may not correspond to the set of physical goods whose levels change, and the assessment of
gains and losses when trading oﬀ diﬀerent goods depends on how similar they are hedonically. For
example, a restaurant goer who faces a set of forty possible dishes might psychologically categorize
them by type (not individual dish), so that she experiences no loss if she eats any one of the
twenty Chinese dishes she thought possible, somewhat of a loss if she eats an Italian meal—and a
signiﬁcant loss if she goes to the movies instead of dinner. More speculatively, it may also be that
goods that are hedonically distinct come to be integrated by consumers who become accustomed to
substituting them. If a diner becomes accustomed to randomly eating either of two gastronomically
dissimilardishes, she may come to assess the consumption of neither as a loss. Accommodating such
possibilities requires substantive assumptions from outside the model and changes the predictions,
6As this intuition suggests, the violation of the law of demand occurs due to the equilibrium feedback of the
market price and behavior into expectations. For any given expectations, demand curves are downward-sloping.
5but we show in Section 5 that our model can fully accommodate these phenomena by applying it
to the appropriate “hedonic” dimensions.
In addition to the ways we believe our model substantially clariﬁes and improves on existing
theories of reference-dependent preferences, it also has an attractive “methodological” feature in
promoting the addition of reference dependence to existing economic models. By deriving gain-
loss utility in a ﬁxed way from consumption utility and by fully endogenizing the reference point
as rational expectations of the outcome given a speciﬁc economic situation, our theory brings us
closer to a universally applicable way to translate any existing reference-independent model into
the corresponding reference-dependent one. Ideally, once the universal gain-loss function, µ, is
speciﬁed, applying our analysis to a given situation would require exactly the same assumptions
that economists using the classical model apply.
The model in this paper does not accomplish this ambitious goal, however. While we believe
applying the model is straightforward in most cases, the necessity of using some psychological
and economic judgment—for instance, in choosing the appropriate hedonic dimensions and the
appropriate notion of “recent expectations”—leaves us signiﬁcantly short of an entirely formulaic
way to extend the classical utility model. Several other shortcomings of our analysis are clear.
Many of our speciﬁc assumptions are based on intuition rather than direct evidence. And there are
also clearly some settings—most importantly, where a person’s reference point acclimates to the
consequences of a choice long before experiencing those consequences—where the same principles
motivating our approach would in fact lead to a diﬀerent reduced-form model. We discuss such
shortcomings and gaps, some possible resolutions, as well as further economic applications of our
model, in Section 6.
2 Reference-Dependent Utility
To develop our basic model, we start with riskless outcomes. The person’s utility is given by u(c|r),
where c =( c1,c 2,...,c K) ∈ RK is consumption and r =( r1,r 2,...,rK) ∈ RK is a “reference level”
of consumption. For now it is easiest to think of the vector c as a vector of consumption goods.
6To capture preferences over risky outcomes, suppose that c is drawn according to the probability




Our model extends reference-dependent preferences to situations in which the reference point
itself might also be a probability measure. Such an allowance is clearly necessary in our framework,
where we assume the reference point is beliefs about outcomes. Suppose the person’s reference point
is the probability measure G over RK, and her consumption is drawn according to the probability







Our formulation of reference-dependent utility captures, in a simple way, the notion that the
sense of gain or loss from a given consumption outcome derives from comparing it to all outcomes
in the support of the reference lottery. For example, if the reference lottery is a gamble between
$0 and $100, an outcome of $0 feels neutral relative to $0, and like a loss relative to $100, and
the overall sensation of loss increases with the probability of $100 in the reference lottery. That a
person’s utility depends on a reference lottery in addition to the actual outcome is similar to Gul’s
(1991) model of “disappointment aversion,” although his theory of behavior is very diﬀerent from
the one we develop in Section 3.7 Our utility function is also closely related to Sugden’s (2003)
recent model of reference-dependent preferences.8 Sugden, however, does not provide a theory of
reference point determination, as we do below.9
7Also, Gul’s formulation in eﬀect amounts to replacing the reference consumption lottery with its certainty equiv-
alent (according to a reference-independent utility function), to which the utility from actual consumption is then
compared. Thus, two reference lotteries that have the same expected utility generate the same behavior. As a result,
our utility function has similar properties to Gul’s when the reference point is riskless, but not when it is risky.
8The main diﬀerence between Sugden’s utility function and ours is in the way a given consumption outcome is
compared to the reference lottery. In our model, each outcome is compared to all outcomes in the support of the
reference lottery. In Sugden (2003), an outcome is compared only to the outcome that would have resulted from the
reference lottery in the same state.
9Due to its descriptive nature, our theory bears less resemblance to two recent models of reference dependence and
7Contrary to the models of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Machina (1982), and subsequent
models building on these theories, we assume that a person’s preferences are linear in probabilities
given the reference point. The evidence is clear that people’s evaluation of prospects is not linear
in probabilities. We omit this feature of preferences to keep our model simple, doing so with the
impression that there are few interesting interaction eﬀects between such non-linearities and the
central features of our model.
While reference levels matter a lot, the gain or loss relative to a reference point is not all that
people care about. While people assess losing a mug as an unpleasant experience, they may also
care about having the use of a mug the next day. And clearly some of the beneﬁts of having
more money is not just the sensation of having and using more money—but rather the absolute
pleasure of consumption from the goods we spend it on. Hence, we assume that overall utility has
two components: u(c|r) ≡ m(c)+n(c|r), where m(c) is “consumption utility” classically stressed
in economics, and n(c|r) is “gain-loss utility.” This decomposition is of course mathematically
meaningless without the attending assumptions we make about the functions m(c) and n(c|r). We
now turn to specifying and motivating the assumptions we make about these two functions. Among
other advantages, we argue below that our approach of explicitly incorporating consumption utility
into the analysis is clearly more complete in terms of both behavior and welfare than formulations
with a single “value function” that evaluates gains and losses relative to a reference point, and
ignores or suppresses the role of consumption utility in the evaluation of outcomes. Perhaps more
importantly, our approach below facilitates the “translation” of a classical (reference-independent)
model into a reference-dependent one by taking the utility function from that model and identifying
it with our m(·).
status quo bias, Masatlioglu and Ok (2002) and Sagi (2002). These authors start by formulating normative axioms
that allow for reference eﬀects, and derive the utility representations these axioms imply. Our focus, instead, is on
building a descriptive model that is broadly consistent with a variety of evidence. As a result, our theory does not
satisfy some of the basic normative postulates these authors propose, such as both papers’ “no-cycling” assumption
and the feature of Masatlioglu and Ok’s theory that the status quo is irrelevant for choice once it is abandoned. (And,
while we speciﬁcally do not think of our model as normative, we also do not ﬁnd these particular axioms normatively
compelling.)
8Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to consumption-utility functions m which are addi-
tively separable across dimensions: m(c) ≡
PK
k=1 mk(ck), where the functions mk are diﬀerentiable
and strictly increasing. At the cost of some complication, the framework could be generalized
to nonseparable consumption utility. Provocatively, however, we will argue in Section 5 that for
the purposes of specifying reference-dependent preferences it is always appropriate to reformulate
utility theory into hedonic dimensions that are separable.
We assume that a person assesses gain-loss utility in each dimension separately: n(c|r) ≡
PK
k=1 nk(ck|rk). Thus, in evaluating how satisﬁed she is with the outcome, the decisionmaker
“breaks up” deviations in consumption from the reference level into deviations in individual dimen-
sions. In combination with loss aversion, this separability of gain-loss utility across dimensions is
at the crux of many implications of reference-dependent utility, including the endowment eﬀect.
Beyond saying that a person cares about consumption in addition to gain-loss utility, we also
propose that there is a strong relationship between the two. Consider the following thought exper-
iment. A person is endowed with 100 paper clips and 100 $10 bills as part of her reference point,
and must choose between two gambles: a 50-50 chance of gaining a paper clip or losing a paper clip,
and the comparable gamble involving $10 bills. It seems likely that she would risk losing the paper
clip rather than the money, and do so because her sensation of gains and losses is generally likely
to be smaller for a good whose consumption utility is smaller: Insofar as her concern for a paper
clip is negligible relative to her concern for $10, the paper-clip lottery is essentially a way to reject
the monetary gamble.10 Yet if m is approximately linear for such small stakes, the choice depends
almost entirely on n, so that the prediction must derive from a comparison of the relative slopes
of gain-loss utility in the paper-clip dimension and gain-loss utility in the money dimension. Any
model of reference-dependent preferences that does not relate gain-loss assessments to consumption
utility is not equipped to provide guidance in this or related examples.
While it surely exaggerates the tight connection between the two components, our model as-
sumes that how a person feels about gaining or losing in a dimension depends solely on the changes
10In hypothetical questions to our classes totalling over eighty students, virtually everyone chose to risk losing the
paper clip. We have not run the experiment with real paper clips.
9in consumption utility associated with such gains or losses. Speciﬁcally, we assume that:
nk(ck|rk) ≡ µ(mk(ck)− mk(rk)), (3)
where µ(·) is a “universal gain-loss function.” This says that the evaluation of gain or loss in
dimension k depends in a universal way on the change in a person’s dimension-k consumption
utility caused by the deviation from the reference point.
Inspired by the model in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), as enhanced by Bowman, Minehart,
and Rabin (1999), we assume that µ satisﬁes the following properties:
A0. µ(x) is continuous for all x, twice diﬀerentiable for x 6= 0, and µ(0) = 0.
A1. µ(x) is strictly increasing.
A2. If y>x>0, then µ(y)+µ(−y) <µ (x)+µ(−x).





−(0) ≡ λ>1, where µ0
+(0) ≡ limx→0µ0(|x|) and µ0
−(0) ≡ limx→0 µ0(−|x|).
Assumptions A2 and A4 capture the key property of reference-dependent preferences, that losses
resonate more strongly than gains. A2 captures this notion of loss aversion for “large” stakes, and
A4 for “small” ones. The slope of µ determines how much the person cares about departures from
her reference point relative to consumption utility: ﬁxing λ, the importance of gain-loss utility is
increasing in µ0
+(0).
Assumption A3 captures another important feature of how people assess departures from their
reference levels. Namely, preferences exhibit diminishing sensitivity: The marginal change in gain-
loss sensations is greater for changes that are close to one’s reference level than for changes that
are further away. While the inequalities in A3 are most realistically considered strict to capture
diminishing sensitivity, we shall often be interested in characterizing the implications of reference
dependence where diminishing sensitivity does not play a big role. For doing so, we deﬁne an
alternative to A3 that isolates loss aversion in our model by eliminating the diminishing sensitivity.
A30. For all x 6=0 ,µ 00(x)=0 .
10Our ﬁrst observation about the model is that it captures two basic aspects commonly associated
with reference-dependent preferences. First, that ﬁxing the outcome, a person is happier with a
lower reference point than with a higher one (Part 1); and second, that preferences exhibit a status
quo bias (Parts 2 and 3):
Proposition 1 If µ satisﬁes Assumptions A0-A4, then the following hold.
1. For all F,G,G 0 such that for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}, the marginal G0
k ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates Gk, U(F|G) ≥ U(F|G0).
2. For any c,c0 ∈ RK, c 6= c0,u(c|c0) ≥ u(c0|c0) ⇒ u(c|c) >u (c0|c).
3. Suppose µ satisﬁes A30. Then, for any F, F0 such that F 6= F0, U(F|F0) ≥ U(F0|F0) ⇒
U(F|F) >U(F0|F).
Parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 1 mean that if a person is willing to abandon her reference point
for an alternative, then she prefers the alternative if that is her reference point. Under Assumptions
A0-A4, this is always true for riskless consumption bundles, and is an immediate consequence of
loss aversion. For a bundle c to be preferred to the reference point c0 in a situation where c0 is
better along some dimensions, c must oﬀer larger gains over c0 in the dimensions in which it is
better. And in that case, to avoid large losses in these dimensions, the person would not choose c0
when the reference point is c. But the analogous statement for lotteries over consumption bundles
requires the more restrictive assumption A30. If a person has little diminishing sensitivity in the
loss domain, and substantial diminishing sensitivity in the gain domain, she would rather suﬀer
small gains and losses than large ones. Thus, she might prefer F over the reference point F0 because
it oﬀers a number of small gains and losses instead of fewer large gains and losses. But when the
reference point is F, it may no longer be true that F oﬀers enough small gains to be preferred to
F0.11 That the person likes to “stick to” her reference point is a crucial property in generating a
11For a counterexample, suppose that there are two dimensions, money and a consumption good. Let F be a lottery
that gives each of the consumption vectors (0,0),(10,0), and (20,0) with equal probability, and let F
0 be a lottery
11number of our results, including the endowment eﬀect and multiple personal equilibria in Section
4 below.
In fact, as long as income eﬀects are negligible, Part 2 of Proposition 1 implies the endowment
eﬀect in a straightforward way. Let K = 2, the two dimensions being “mugs” and “money,” and
normalize the person’s current wealth level and endowment of other mugs to zero. Let c0 =( 0 ,0),
and suppose pb is the price for which c =( 1 ,−pb) satisﬁes u(c|c0)=u(c0|c0). That is, pb is the
person’s “buying price:” it is the maximum amount of money for which she is still willing to buy
the mug, when her endowment and reference point is not to buy it.12 Then, by Proposition 1,
u(c|c) >u (c0|c). This means that if a person is endowed with a mug, she is not willing to trade it
for pb; equivalently, her “selling price” is greater than her buying price.
Although our speciﬁcation of preferences is diﬀerent from previous formulations, it shares some
of their key properties. In fact, in an important special case, when m is linear, our utility function
has exactly the same qualitative properties as Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory modiﬁed
to assume that decisions weights are linearized to be probabilities.
Proposition 2 If m is linear and µ satisﬁes Assumptions A0-A4, then there exists {vk}K
k=1 satis-




vk(ck − rk). (4)




72), with equal probability. F and F
0 each give the same expected money outcome,
with F
0 riskier than F, but F
0 gives a deterministically better consumption outcome. Suppose that consumption
utility is given by m1(x)=m2(x)=x, and that the universal gain-loss function is µ(x)=x for x ≤ 0, µ(x)=0 .9x
for 0 ≤ x ≤ 10, and µ(x)=9+0 .05(x − 10) for x ≥ 10. That is, the decisionmaker has no diminishing sensitivity
in losses, but her sensitivity to gains drops substantially at x = 10. One can verify that U(F|F) − U(F




0) > 0. Intuitively, F is better than F
0 in the money dimension, because—irrespective of whether
the agent’s reference point is F or F
0—it breaks up large gains and losses into smaller ones. However, since a reference
point of F
0 generates larger gains and losses overall, this advantage is greater when the reference point is F
0. Given
that F
0 is slightly better than F in the consumption dimension, F is preferred when F
0 is the reference point, but
not when F is the reference point.
12It is not obvious how our assumption that the reference point is the agent’s endowment can be made consistent
with our view that expectations are the reference point. We discuss this issue in Section 3.












This special case is all the more important because for most small departures from the reference
point, m can be taken to be approximately linear, at least relative to the curvature of µ. Thus, for
small changes in case of a non-linear m as well as a linear consumption utility, our utility function
shares the qualitative properties of standard formulations of prospect theory.
Of course, this equivalence holds only when we assume that the gains and losses are small enough
not to signiﬁcantly change the marginal utility of consumption. When the changes are larger, or
when marginal utilities change very quickly in the dimension being examined, the equivalence
breaks down. In this range, the properties we posit for µ which are inspired by what prospect
theory posits for the observable “value function” do not necessarily hold for this observable value
function.
This may, however, be a good thing. We believe it likely that when consumption changes lead
to dramatic changes in the marginal consumption value of the goods, u(c|r) − u(r|r) will violate
Assumptions A0-A4 in the way predicted by our model. Suppose, for instance, that a person’s
endowment of water is two quarts above the consumption level needed for survival. Then, our
model predicts that, if forced to choose one or the other, she would absorb a sure loss of one
quart in water consumption rather than risk a one-third chance of losing three quarts. Thus, her
observable value function does not feature risk lovingness in losses. This reﬂects both the fact
that her consumption utility is very concave in that region, and that her sense of loss from a
one-quart drop in consumption is signiﬁcantly smaller than her sense of loss from an additional
one-quart decrease.13 If, on the other hand, the person is just below the minimum sustainable water
13Similarly, when large losses in consumption or wealth are involved, we believe that diminishing marginal utility
of wealth as economists conventionally conceive of it is likely to do battle with the diminishing sensitivity in losses
emphasized in prospect theory. This perspective may help explain why the diminishing sensitivity in losses is less
ﬁrmly established than the other features of the prospect-theory value function, especially when large losses are
involved. It is our impression that both the ambiguity of features of the value function and the tension between
13consumption—so that her consumption utility is very convex around her endowment—she would
be much happier about a one-quart increase in water consumption than she would be unhappy
about a one-quart decrease. Thus, our theory predicts that in this situation her observable value
function does not feature loss aversion.
3 The Reference Point as (Endogenous) Expectations
Most laboratory studies of reference-dependent preferences analyze subjects’ preferences over gains
and losses in situations where the reference point is arguably clear—and usually the status quo.
Unfortunately, while a mass of evidence regarding preferences given the reference level has been
accumulated, there is much less empirical or theoretical research on the determinants of reference
points.14 Despite the shortage of evidence, for several reasons we take the strong view in our model
that the reference point is determined by a person’s expectations about what she is going to get.
Some evidence does indicate that expectations are more important than the status quo or lagged
consumption in determining a person’s sensation of gain or loss. In Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov
(1999), subjects’ reported emotions after the outcome of a lottery depended systematically on both
the outcome and the lottery’s unobtained outcome. For example, subjects were (unsurprisingly)
always happier with an $8 gain than with an $8 loss, holding constant the alternative possible
outcome. But whichever outcome they obtained, they were happier if the alternative was a loss of
$32 than if the alternative was a gain of $32. Although it is not clear whether brain imaging studies
can be interpreted in terms of preferences, a suggestive ﬁnding by Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman,
Dale, and Shizgal (2001) is that neural responses to the outcome of a lottery also depend on both
consumption utility and gain-loss utility have been intuited by prior researchers, but we are unaware of any model
that addresses the issue.
14A passage in Tversky and Kahneman (1991, pp. 1046-47) is representative: “A treatment of reference-dependent
choice raises two questions: what is the reference state, and how does it aﬀect preferences? The present analysis
focuses on the second question. We assume that the decision maker has a deﬁnite reference state X, and we investigate
its impact on the choice between options. The question of the origin and the determinants of the reference state lies
beyond the scope of the present article. Although the reference state usually corresponds to the decision maker’s
current position, it can also be inﬂuenced by aspirations, expectations, norms, and social comparisons.”
14the outcome and unobtained outcomes. More precisely, if a subject received $0 in a lottery with
possible outcomes of $0, $2.50, and $10, activation in the sublenticular extended amygdala and
nucleus accumbens regions of the brain was more negative than if she received $0 in a lottery with
possible outcomes of $0, -$1.50, and -$6.
There is also evidence that expectations inﬂuence preferences through physiological changes.
Certain types of consumption induce responses aimed at keeping our biological system in balance.
But not only does one’s body react to consumption that has already occurred, it can “prepare” for it
beforehand. The expectation to consume is an important mediator in this feedforward homeostatic
regulation, which changes the marginal utility of consumption.15 Ever since Pavlov’s dogs invented
salivation, for instance, the expectation that a nice meal is imminent leads all of us to release saliva
and stomach acids, making us hungrier.
Our hypothesis that the reference point is expectations may seem to ﬂy in the face of most
existing empirical research on loss aversion, which virtually all researchers have assumed either
explicitly or implicitly to indicate that the reference level is the pre-choice status quo.16 Yet we
believe these same experiments can also naturally be interpreted in terms of expectations. Consider
the classic endowment-eﬀect experiment. If a subject is given a mug and is told it is hers to keep,
her expected endowment of mugs ten minutes from now might reasonably be one mug. Thus,
relative to expectations, not being able to keep the mug is a loss. In fact, in the typical experiment
all subjects are given a mug (the buyers for inspection), but only some—the owners—are told it
is theirs to keep. Arguably, the diﬀerence between owners and non-owners is not current or lagged
physical possession, but rather expectation of future possession.17
15See Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) for a discussion of some of these issues.
16More generally, many researchers have posited that the reference point is a weighted sum of past consumption.
(See Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) for a more detailed discussion of some of the speciﬁc functional forms that
have been discussed.) Such an account of how reference levels are determined seems intuitive, but very little evidence
has been gathered on its validity. One exception to this is Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998), who show that an
agent’s selling price for a mug (what else) increases with the time—in their experiment, up to 20 minutes—the mug
has been in her endowment.
17In fact, some striking results by Plott and Zeiler (2003) can be interpreted as suggesting that if owners and
non-owners do not diﬀer in their expectation of future possession, the endowment eﬀect is not observed. In their
15Thought experiments on the implications of loss aversion in labor markets and in consumer
behavior also suggest a central role for expectations. An employee who gets a 5% raise after she
was expecting a 10% one probably does not experience much of a sensation of gain, in contrast
to what reference-dependent preferences based on the status quo or lagged consumption would
predict. Similarly, a consumer who goes to the store with the conscious expectation to buy a TV
may not experience much of a loss from spending money on the TV. In fact, if a much-anticipated
TV is not available, she will assess its lack as a loss. Thus, she experiences a loss only if she does
not spend money.
For many experiences, a status-quo theory of the reference point would not only make wrong
predictions, it would alsohave littlesubstance. For example, if a person expects to undergo a painful
dental procedure, ﬁnding out that she does not have to undergo it after all may feel like a gain. Yet
she has not gained a “non-procedure” any more than somebody who never expected the procedure.
In fact, there is no meaningful way in which diﬀerent people have diﬀerent status quo endowments
of dental procedures, so irrespective of expectations a status quo theory would always predict the
same gain-loss utility from these experiences. Since so many examples of reference dependence—
including food, entertainment, and travel—involve ﬂeeting consumption opportunities, where no
good is in one’s endowment prior to consumption, cases where the reference point cannot be the
status quo may even be the typical environment where these models apply.
While we believe that expectations play a central role in determining reference points, we do not
claim that they determine them completely. A clear exception to the heavy inﬂuence of expectations
is sensory experiences. A person feels the contrast eﬀects of walking out of a warm apartment into
experiment, subjects went through 2 unpaid and 14 paid practice rounds buying and selling lotteries. In the 15th paid
round, then, Plott and Zeiler ran a classic endowment eﬀect experiment using mugs, and observed no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between buying and selling prices—with point estimates actually contrary to the endowment
eﬀect. An interpretation of the reported results is that the practice rounds acclimate subjects to the prospect that
they might soon give up goods they receive, and buy goods they do not receive. Under these circumstances, our
theory predicts a substantial narrowing of the gap between buying and selling prices. (Our model would not, however,
explain their empirical ﬁnding of a complete elimination of the eﬀect.) See also List (2003), who ﬁnds that experienced
sports card traders do not show an endowment eﬀect. Once again, one interpretation of this ﬁnding is that more
experienced traders come not to expect to necessarily keep any particular item they have just acquired.
16the illegitimately cold Boston winter no matter how much she expects the cold.18 While our model
is unrealistically extreme in designating expectations as the sole reference point, we hope that, at a
minimum, our concrete formulation will prompt experiments and other empirical work that directly
study the nature of reference points.19
The above evidence and intuitions lead us to propose expectations as an appropriate theory of
reference points. But doing so confronts us with some important conceptual issues. Most economic
situations of interest involve choice, and what a person wants to do depends on her preferences.
Therefore, so long as she has some ability to predict her own behavior, not only do preferences
depend on expectations—expectations depend on preferences as well. If a person’s expectations
are not wholly exogenous and typically incorrect, this feedback must be taken into account. This
suggests that it is appropriate to model even individual decisionmaking in terms of an “equilibrium”
concept that requires a person’s expectations to be consistent with her own eventual outcomes—
which depend on both the choice set she happens to face and the choice she makes from that
set.
In our formal model, the decisionmaker makes a single choice from some choice set D ⊂ ∆(RK).
18There is also evidence that we compare our outcomes to our aspirations and goals. Locke and Latham (1991)
report that setting higher goals leads subjects to produce higher performance. And according to Heath, Larrick, and
Wu (1999), a person who has failed to reach a goal feels worse than one who performed identically but did reach her
goal. (Even here, however, a crisper notion of how goals inﬂuence expectations would prove essential to interpreting
results.) In addition, it seems that people’s experiences with outcomes are aﬀected by relevant social comparisons.
Clark and Oswald (1996) conclude that workers are less satisﬁed with their jobs if others with similar labor market
characteristics have higher income. More generally, the literature on social comparison theory in psychology highlights
that people tend to compare themselves to relevant others along a number of dimensions, with positive comparisons
being pleasant, and negative comparisons being unpleasant.
19Experiments in which subjects’ expectations are carefully controlled would prove especially fruitful. Ariely and
K˝ oszegi have (in a never-to-be-published experimental study) attempted to do this. Half of the students at an MIT
undergraduate class were told that they would receive a mug with a 90% probability, and half were told that they
would receive it with 10% probability. Selling prices conditional on getting the mug were then elicited. The diﬀerence
between the two conditions was statistically insigniﬁcant (in the direction predicted by our theory). While this result
is inconsistent with our model, we feel that the notion of specifying the reference point as expectations is suﬃciently
compelling to warrant careful further study.
17Before her decision, however, she may not know the choice set she is going to face. Rather, she may
have probabilistic beliefs. Suppose that the collection of possible choice sets, {Dl}l∈R is indexed
continuously (in the Hausdorﬀ metric) by the real numbers, and is determined probabilistically by
the distribution Q over R. Based on this, we deﬁne:
















If the person expects to choose Fl from choice set Dl, then (given her expectations over possible
choice sets) she anticipates receiving the distribution of outcomes
R
FldQ(l). Deﬁnition 1 says that
if this is the person’s reference point, she should indeed be willing to choose Fl from the set Dl for
each l.
The personal-equilibrium solution concept can be illustrated with the example of consumer
purchases, which we will analyze in more detail in Section 4. Suppose a consumer goes to the store
to possibly buy a pair shoes, but does not know their price until she gets to the store. Her choice
set (over shoe-money allocations) at the time of the purchase decision depends of course on the
unique realized price she ends up facing. The person’s planned behavior in each choice set (i.e. her
decision whether to buy, as a function of the price), combined with the distribution over possible
choice sets (prices), implies a distribution of outcomes that becomes the decisionmaker’s reference
point. Personal equilibrium requires her planned behavior in each choice set to be optimal given
this reference point.
Because this is simply an application to our environment of personal equilibrium as ﬁrst deﬁned
in K˝ oszegi (2001,2003), Theorem 1 of K˝ oszegi (2003) establishes that, if each Dl is convex and
compact, and they have a uniformly bounded support, a personal equilibrium exists.
The key idea behind our formulation is that a person’s preferences depend on expectations she
held after the time she started focusing on the problem, but prior to the time of consumption.
That is, preferences depend on lagged expectations. If preferences depended solely on expectations
after all decisions are made and all uncertainty is realized, our model would reduce to a solely
outcome-based utility. But we posit that preferences do not react so quickly: while expectations
about whether shoes are available may adjust immediately once the consumer enters the store,
18this adjustment in expectations does not immediately eliminate the consumer’s comparison of the
outcome to what she expected just prior to entering the store.20 It bears emphasizing that our
model is not based on the premise that beliefs are slow to adjust to new information—but that
preferences do not immediately change when beliefs are revised.21
The other part of our psychological hypothesis is that preferences depend on expectations after
the decisionmaker started focusing on the decision. Whether or not the classical model says people
have beliefs about everything at all times, we assume such beliefs if they exist do not inﬂuence
preferences until they come somewhat into focus. The speciﬁcation of Q should incorporate this
aspect of the person’s decision problem, and is therefore an important interpretational matter in
any application. As an illustration, consider again the shoe-shopping consumer who does not know
the price of a pair of shoes until she gets to the store. Even in this ﬁxed economic environment, Q
depends on when the person started thinking about the decision. If she had been thinking about
her possible purchase for a long time, her expectations from before she knew the price signiﬁcantly
aﬀect her preferences. In this case, Q is the non-deterministic lottery representing her probabilistic
beliefs over prices. It could also be that she only considered the possible purchase once she got to
the store and found out the price. In this case, Q should be speciﬁed as the deterministic lottery
corresponding to this price.
This setup also provides a way to interpret the situation subjects face in endowment-eﬀect
experiments, where we are inclined to believe behavior may typically be “non-equilibrium” in that
subjects’ expectations do not accord to what we researchers know to be the typical outcomes of
experiments.22 At the beginning of a typical experiment, subjects learn their role as either an
20Similarly, a drug addict who was expecting to shoot up, but now ﬁnds the drug unavailable, does not instanta-
neously stop craving the drug.
21Our notion of personal equilibrium is related to Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti’s (1989) notion of psycholog-
ical Nash equilibrium in games. In both models, utility depends on beliefs. But in their case, these are higher-order
beliefs about strategies, and in our case, they are about the agent’s own outcomes. Another conceptual diﬀerence is
our emphasis that preferences depend on lagged expectations. However, we have not fully explored the relationship
between the two solution concepts.
22Although we demonstrate in Section 4 that endowment-eﬀect type behavior would also result in personal equi-
librium, probably few subjects reach such equilibrium within the time course of the experiment.
19“owner” of a mug or a “non-owner”. Clearly, subjects do not think of their mug possessions until
this point. Plausibly, their reference point then becomes aligned with their ownership status. Once
subjects examine the mug, they are informed of the possibilityof trade. We think of this opportunity
as a “surprise.” Surprises are formalized by assuming a binary Q =( D,1−￿;D0,￿), where ￿ is small,
D is the choice set the person expects, and D0 is the decision she is unexpectedly thrust into. Thus,
we think of a surprise opportunity as an ex ante low-probability event that happens to materialize.
As a consequence, a person’s expectations are mostly based on a diﬀerent choice set than the one
she actually chooses from. In endowment-eﬀect experiments, where the opportunity for trade is
typically not highlighted until after subjects are given ownership, preferences will be determined
by ownership status. In less extreme form, a similar logic applies to experiments where trades are
carried out only probabilitically, because in these situations subjects are likely to retain their status
quo even if they are aware of the trading opportunities and would like to take advantage of them.
4 Equilibrium Shopping
In this section we explore some of the implications of our model for the market behavior of con-
sumers, where our theory has important implications for how a consumer’s valuation for a good
is endogenously determined by market conditions and her own anticipated behavior. While we
believe the issues in this paper have far less direct inﬂuence on ﬁrm behavior (ﬁrms are less likely
to be subject to gain-loss eﬀects), market response to the consumer phenomena we discuss could
have a profound indirect eﬀect on the behavior of ﬁrms, marketers, and salespeople.23
Suppose there are two dimensions of choice: shoes and money, with m(c)=c1+c2. To isolatethe
consequences of loss aversion, we assume that µ satisﬁes A30: it is two-piece linear with µ0
+(0) = η
and µ0
−(0) = ηλ > η. In this formulation, η can be interpreted as the weight a consumer attaches
to gain-loss utility, and λ is her “coeﬃcient of loss aversion”. Normalizing the consumer’s current
endowment to (0,0), we ﬁrst consider whether she will buy a single pair of shoes at price p.
23See Heidhues and K˝ oszegi (2004) for an analysis of a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist’s response to consumer loss
aversion.
20Suppose the consumer expects to buy the shoes. Then her utility from buying is 1−p, and her
utility from not buying is η(p− λ). Thus, she will buy the shoes if p ≤
1+ηλ
1+η ≡ pmax. By contrast,
if she expects not to buy the shoes, her utility from buying is 1−p−ηλp+η, and her utility from
not buying is zero. Thus, she does not buy if p ≥
1+η
1+ηλ ≡ pmin. More generally, if the consumer
expects to buy with probability q ∈ [0,1], the utility from buying is 1 − p +( 1− q)η(1− λp), and




These observations in turn mean that there are three pertinent ranges of the market price. For
p>p max, the unique equilibrium is not to buy the shoes. For p<p min, the unique equilibrium
is to buy it. But for prices p ∈ (pmin,p max), there are two pure-strategy personal equilibria—one
where she for sure buys, one where for sure she doesn’t.24 In this range, therefore, the consumer’s
expectations are self-fulﬁlling: she buys the shoes if and only if she expects to. Thus, in contrast
to standard utility theory, her demand is not uniquely determined by her preferences. Intuitively,
if the consumer expects to get the shoes, she feels a loss if she does not buy them, and the money
she saves in the process is coded as a gain. Being more sensitive to losses, she is drawn to buying.
On the other hand, if she expects to keep the money, buying results in a loss of money and a gain
in shoes. Thus, she is inclined toward keeping the money.
The consumer’s consumption utility combines with her universal gain-loss function to determine
what the range of multiple equilibria is. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) suggest that in most
domains where sizes of losses and gains can be measured, people value moderate losses roughly twice




k(x) = 2 is equivalent to
1+ηλ
1+η =2 ,
which implies that the range of multiple equilibrium prices is [1
2,2]. That is, the indeterminacy
ranges from a price equal to half of the consumer’s intrinsic valuation for the shoes to twice of it.25
24In addition, for p ∈ (pmin,p max), there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium as well. This equilibrium is
unstable in the sense that adaptive dynamics will lead the agent away from this equilibrium (and toward one of the
pure ones). This unstable mixed-strategy equilibrium leads to counterintuitive comparative statics: as p increases,
the mixed strategy requires that the agent buy the good with higher probability.
25The multiple-equilibrium phenomenon, and the fact that it can occur over a wide range of prices, has important
implications for marketing and sales techniques. In addition to classical objectives, it becomes crucial for marketers
to make sure their clients play the “right” equilibrium, willing to buy the product at relatively high prices.
21Reference-dependent preferences can lead to even more interesting and surprising behavior when
the consumer is uncertain about the price she will pay. As the above example demonstrates, for
a price of pmax, it is an equilibrium for the consumer to buy the shoes. Now suppose that she
faces a possibly lower, uncertain price: with probability one-half, the price is pH = pmax, and with
probability one-half, it is pL > 1, where pL <p H.
Though the price has decreased (in a stochastic-dominance sense), it is now not an equilibrium
for the consumer to buy the shoes with probability one. If that was her reference point, then her





The second part of this expression is the loss associated with comparing the high price to the lower
one the consumer could have gotten. The consumer’s utility from not buying is
1
2
η(pH + pL) − ηλ.
Relative to buying, not doing so leads to (average) savings of 1
2(pH +pL), and to a loss of the good.
By the deﬁnition of pH = pmax, these expressions imply that the consumer prefers not to buy when
the price is high. Is it an equilibrium for her to buy if and only if the price is low? Suppose her




η(−λpL +1 ) , (6)




For pL > 1, she prefers not to buy the shoes.
While at the deterministically high price it is an equilibrium for the consumer to buy the shoes,
at these stochastically lower prices it is the unique equilibrium never to buy! The intuition for this
violation of the law of demand is the following. Once there is a possibility of acquiring the shoes at
a cheaper price, the consumer would experience a loss from paying the higher price instead. Due
to this “comparison eﬀect,” she does not buy at the high price. But as our multiple-equilibrium
22example demonstrates, a decrease in the probability with which the consumer expects to buy the
shoes decreases her willingness to pay for it. Therefore, if the lower price is still suﬃciently high,
she never buys them.26
The comparison eﬀect is crucial for a price drop to decrease demand. That is, the lower price
distribution has to be stochastic for our example to work: if it is an equilibrium to buy at a given
(stochastic or deterministic) price, it is also an equilibrium to buy at any lower deterministic price.
In standard consumer theory, a consumer’s reservation price for an item does not depend on
the ex ante distribution of prices. As the above example illustrates, with reference-dependent
preferences the distribution can radically and systematically change the reservation price.27
In general, consumer behavior is considerably more complex in our framework than in the stan-
dard one. We now turn to a more comprehensive analysis of the consumer’s behavior as a function
of the distribution of prices she is facing, and derive a few properties of personal equilibrium.
Suppose F is the cumulative distribution function of possible prices for the shoes, with support
[p,p]. For any given reference point, it is clear that there is a price pr (not necessarily in [p,p])
below which the consumer buys the good, and above which she does not. Consequently, equilibrium
behavior also has this property. To solve for equilibrium, then, consider, for any pr and q ∈ [0,1],
the distribution of outcomes Gb(pr,q) induced by buying the good with probability one if the price
is less than pr, and with probability q if the price is exactly pr (and not buying if its price is greater
than pr). We deﬁne the correspondence B(pr) in the following way. For any Gb(pr,q), consider the
net utility associated with buying the good at pr, when the reference point is Gb(pr,q):
U ((1,−pr)|Gb(pr,q))− U ((0,0)|Gb(pr,q)). (8)
26The presence of multiple equilibria is not necessary for a violation of the law of demand to occur. Due to the
comparison eﬀect, it could be the case that for a distribution of prices the unique equilibrium is to buy with probability
one, but for a stochastically lower distribution the unique equilibrium is to buy with probability less than one. To
construct such an example, both distributions need to be stochastic.
27A particular implication of this property of our model is that value revelation mechanisms that are tradition-
ally considered “incentive compatible”—such as a second-price auction with private values or the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (1964) procedure—do not in fact reveal any intrinsic valuation, but are sensitive to participants’ expecta-
tions about the outcome.
23B(pr) ⊂ R is the set of these net utilities, as we vary q. Note that B(pr) is single-valued unless pr
is an atom of F. Clearly, p∗
r is an equilibrium reservation price if 0 ∈ B(p∗
r). It is clear that B(pr)
is upper semi-continuous and convex-valued. Furthermore, B(0) > 0, and limpr→∞ B(pr)=−∞.
Thus, there is at least one equilibrium.
For an atomless distribution, it is easy to derive the function B(pr). If the consumer expects
to buy the good below prices pr, her utility from buying at pr is
1− pr | {z }
cons.
utility








relative to not buy
states
.
The ﬁrst term is the consumption utility derived from buying the good. The second term is the
consumer’s gain-loss utility from comparing a purchase at price pr to other purchases, which are
all at lower prices. The third derives from comparing a purchase to not purchasing the good. This
results in a loss of pr, and a gain of the good, which is valued at 1. Not buying the good oﬀered at
pr results in a total utility of
ηF(pr)(E[p|p<p r]− λ),
which derives from comparing not buying the good to the possibility of buying. This leads to a
sense of gain from saving the average purchase price of the shoes, and a sense of loss due to not
having the shoes. Combining these two expressions, we get
B(pr)=1− pr − η(λ− 1)F(pr)(pr − E[p|p<p r]) + η(1− F(pr))(1− λpr)+ηF(pr)(λ− pr). (9)
To illustrate how small changes in the distribution can aﬀect demand, we assume speciﬁcally
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(10)
24Equation 10 is a quadratic function of pr. Simple arithmetic shows that the coeﬃcient on p2
r is
η(λ−1)
2(¯ p−p) > 0, and the coeﬃcient on pr is
η(λ−1)
¯ p−p − 1 − ηλ.
We investigate the behavior of equilibria when p is around pmin, under the assumption that the
quadratic part of B(pr) is increasing. This is equivalent to the following condition:
B0(pmin)=
η(λ− 1)(pmin +1 )
¯ p − p
− 1 − ηλ > 0,
which is true if ¯ p − p < 1 −
(1+η)2
(1+ηλ)2. In that case, as long as p ≥ pmin, B(pr) has a zero at pmin
(since the ﬁrst part of the curve has a zero at pmin). That is, it is an equilibrium for the consumer
never to buy the good. Now suppose p <p min, but p ≈ pmin. Then, no matter how little p slips
below pmin, the unique equilibrium is to buy the good with probability 1.
The intuition behind this discontinuity is the following. Once there is a chance for the price to
drop below pmin, in any equilibrium the consumer will want to buy the good with at least some
probability. But expecting some probability of buying, she now feels a small loss if she does not
get the good. This “attachment eﬀect” increases the reservation price to at least slightly above
pmin. This increases the probability with which she expects to buy, increasing the attachment and
thus worsening the pain of loss in case she does not, again increasing the probability of purchase,
and so on. If ¯ p − p is suﬃciently small, this self-reinforcing mechanism is suﬃciently strong for
the equilibrium to unravel. Although the comparison eﬀect is operational in this example, it is
outweighed by the attachment eﬀect. Once again, this is assured by the fact that ¯ p−p is suﬃciently
small (so that the loss the consumer suﬀers when paying the high price is not too great).
We can use experimental evidence to calibrate the strength of the attachment eﬀect as well. If
we take
1+ηλ
1+λ = 2 as before, then ¯ p − p could be close to 3
4 (of the consumer’s valuation for the
good), and unraveling would still occur. This implies that with p slightly above one-half (pmin),
the consumer does not necessarily buy the good at that price. But when p slips below one-half, in
the unique resulting equilibrium she buys it even at a 150 percent higher price.
In both of the unraveling examples above, uncertainty leads to a unique equilibrium. The
tendency for suﬃcient uncertainty to lead to a unique equilibrium is a general phenomenon:
Proposition 3 For all η and λ, there exists ε>0 such that for all non-atomic price distributions
25F for which f(·) <εeverywhere, the personal equilibrium is unique.
This result is potentially very important for applications of our model where the indeterminacy
of consumer behavior due to the multiple-equilibrium phenomenon makes analysis diﬃcult, and
where no obvious equilibrium selection rule presents itself.
While uncertainty leads to a unique equilibrium in both of our examples, the examples are
very diﬀerent in at least one way: in the ﬁrst, a probabilistic price decrease leads to a decrease
in demand, while in the other it leads to an increase. The following proposition summarizes the
principles behind the two examples.
Proposition 4 Suppose F and F0 are nonatomic distributions, and p∗
r is a personal-equilibrium
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equilibrium reservation price when the price distribution is F0.
Proposition 4 can be thought of as summarizing the eﬀect of possible sales (probabilistic price
decreases) on consumers’ reservation prices, and consequently demand. We can distinguish two
situations. If the price drops down from a level at which the consumer would have bought anyway,
then the existence of the sale has the paradoxical eﬀect of decreasing demand (Part 1 of the
proposition). This is due to the comparison eﬀect. The reservation price is by deﬁnition the
highest price the consumer is ever going to pay for the good, so buying at that price necessarily
feels like a loss when compared to other possible purchase prices. And the lower the other possible
prices, the greater the consumer’s sense of loss from buying, pushing down the reservation price.
When the price drops from above the decisionmaker’s reservation price to below it, however, the
price decrease can increase demand. This in itself is not too surprising, since the probability that
26the price is below the reservation level increases. But by Part 2 of Proposition 4, such a price drop
can have the additional eﬀect of increasing the reservation price, and thereby further increasing
demand. This “multiplier” is the attachment eﬀect at work. Since the consumer now expects to
buy with a higher probability, she is more attached to the idea of having the good, increasing her
reservation price.28
In interpreting these results, some care must be taken in identifying which price changes should
indeed be modeled as random prices. A stochastic price in our model corresponds to true price
uncertainty, where the consumer forms expectations before ﬁnding out the price. This is diﬀerent
from price variations that consumers can predict and incorporate into their expectations. On
Memorial Day sales, for example, prices at many stores are signiﬁcantly lower than at most other
times of the year. Nevertheless, since consumers know about and expect these sales, the appropriate
way to specify their decision problem is to assume a price distribution weighted heavily toward low
prices. Therefore, our theory predicts that consumers would in general respond diﬀerently to these
sales than to less predictable price drops.
The logic behind Proposition 4 could also shed light on non-equilibrium situations in which
buyers believe that the price is lower than it actually is. For example, car dealers sometimes use
the strategy of “throwing a lowball,” in which they promise a really low price, and then attempt
to raise it back up once the consumer gets used to the expectation of buying.29 According to our
model, this strategy may backﬁre, because (due to the comparison eﬀect) the consumer may refuse
to buy at the high price if she was expecting the low one. The strategy is successful, however, if it
engages the attachment eﬀect in a consumer who would not buy at the high price.
The above analysis applies to the agent’s reactions to price changes in personal equilibrium. In
this sense, it is about “long-run” responses—the consumer’s eventual demand once her expectations
adjust. We can distinguish this from “short-run” responses to surprise price changes—her demand
before expectations adjust. The comparison of short-run and long-run price responses leads to
28Note that in order for the attachment eﬀect to create a multiplier, the price cannot drop too much below the
reservation price. If that were to happen, the comparison eﬀect would dominate the attachment eﬀect, and the price
decrease might once again lead to a decrease in demand.
29See Cialdini (1993) for a social-psychological discussion of such sales tactics.
27further stark implications of our model in consumer behavior. To avoid the indeterminacy of
multiple equilibria, we we analyze this issue assuming that the price is suﬃciently risky for the
equilibrium to be unique. We consider a downward shift in the distribution of prices, and ask
whether the short-run or long-run demand response is greater. Formally, a downward shift from a
given price distribution F is modeled as follows. For any positive real z, consider the distribution
Fz deﬁned by Fz(p)=F(p + z). Denote the equilibrium reservation prices for price distributions
F and Fz by p∗
r and pz
r
∗, respectively. Similarly, deﬁne the function Bz(pr) according to Equation
9, with the distribution of prices replaced by Fz.
Since the consumer’s reservation price remains ﬁxed for any short-run price change, the question







r, the consumer will be more willing to buy the good after “getting
used to” the new price distribution than beforehand. But if the inequality goes the other way, her
long-run price elasticity is lower than than her short-run one.











If this expression is greater than zero, then pz
r
∗ >p ∗
r for small positive price shifts z; otherwise,
the opposite is the case. Intuitively, there are two opposing eﬀects that contribute to the diﬀerence
between short-run and long-run elasticities. First, as the consumer becomes to expect lower prices,
she attaches a higher probability to purchasing the good. Therefore, she feels more of a loss if
she does not buy it, and less of a loss in money if she does. This is analogous to the attachment
eﬀect, and increases her long-run demand relative to the short-run one. On the other hand, as the
consumer gets used to the low prices, prices that seemed to be reasonable beforehand now invoke
more of a sensation of loss. This comparison eﬀect decreases her long-run demand.
The consumer’s probability of buying the good (F(p∗
r)) determines the importance of the com-
parison eﬀect, since this eﬀect derives from the comparison of the realized price to other possible
purchase prices. And the consumer’s price responsiveness (which is proportional to f(p∗
r)) de-
termines the importance of the attachment eﬀect, since this eﬀect derives from a change in the
consumer’s anticipated probability of purchase. Thus, it is clear that either eﬀect could dominate.
28In particular, the comparison eﬀect dominates if F(p∗
r) is large relative to f(p∗
r)—if the consumer’s
short-run price elasticity is small.
These predictions distinguish our model from intertemporal models with habit-forming or expe-
rience goods. In habit-formation models, typically the long-run elasticity of consumption is higher
than the short-run elasticity, because in the long run people get used to their new level of consump-
tion. Our model implies not only that the opposite is possible as well, it provides a simple testable
condition for when it is likely to be so.
We conclude our market analysis by characterizing the behavior of sellers facing a distribution
of prices with probability measure F, and compare the behavior of buyers and sellers. Unlike in the
analysis so far, we are primarily motivated by the endowment eﬀect rather than real markets per
se; marketplace sellers are typically not individuals with endowments of goods. We assume that
the seller in question has the same utility function (including the same valuation for the shoes) as
the buyer. In a standard setting, this would imply that the seller and the buyer have the same
reservation price.
As in the case of buyers, in equilibrium the seller follows a reservation price policy, selling the
good when the price is above some given p∗∗
r . For simplicity, we assume that the distribution of
prices is non-atomic, and look for the equilibrium reservation price in a similar way as for buyers.
When the seller expects to sell at prices greater than pr, her utility from selling at price pr is
pr − 1 − ηλ(1 − F(pr))(E[p|p>p r]− pr)+ηF(pr)(pr − λ).
The ﬁrst term in the expression is simply the consumption utility from the transaction. The second
term comes from comparing the consumer’s consumption to states in which she sells. Since in those
states she sells the good at higher prices, she experiences a loss. And the last term derives from
comparing her consumption to states in which she does not sell. This leads her to assess a gain in
money equal to the price, and a loss of the good. The seller’s utility from holding on to the shoes
in the same situation is
−ηλ(1 − F(pr))E[p|p>p r]+η(1 − F(pr)).
29Thus, the net utility from holding to the good relative to selling it is
(1+ η)(1− pr)+η(λ− 1)F(pr) − η(λ− 1)(1− F(pr))pr
As an example, consider the case we have analyzed above for buyers: p ∼ U[p, ¯ p]. Assume
further that
p+¯ p
2 = 1. Notice that S(1) = 0 in that case, so it is an equilibrium for the seller to
adopt the value of the good as her reservation price. It is easy to show that B(1) < 0, so there is
an equilibrium in which the buyer has a reservation price less than 1. This result also generalizes:
Proposition 5 For any personal equilibrium reservation price p∗
r of the buyer, there is a personal
equilibrium reservation price p∗∗
r ≥ p∗
r of the seller, and if F(p∗
r) > 0, then p∗∗
r >p ∗
r. Conversely,
for any personal equilibrium reservation price p∗∗
r of the seller, there is a personal equilibrium
reservation price p∗
r ≤ p∗∗
r of the buyer, and if F(p∗∗
r ) > 0, then p∗
r <p ∗∗
r . In particular, if
reservation prices are unique, the buyer’s is lower.
Our model therefore endogenously generates the endowment eﬀect from the roles of the players,
even though it does not assign any special role to initial endowments. The force that pushes down
the buyer’s reservation price is the comparison eﬀect from above: if she pays the reservation price for
the good, she experiences a loss relative to lower prices, and she can avoid this loss by not buying.
When the seller sells at the reservation price, she only makes a gain (as opposed to avoiding a loss)
relative to the low-price states, in which she does not sell. Of course, she experiences a loss relative
to higher-price states; the reservation price is the lowest price she could have sold at. But crucially,
the seller does not aﬀect this loss by lowering her reservation price. Whether or not she sells at
price pr, she experiences a loss relative to states in which the price is greater than pr.30
30The endowment eﬀect and Proposition 5 seem to indicate a suppression of market trade due to the gap between
buying and selling prices. But importantly, our theory predicts that neither the ﬁndings of endowment-eﬀect exper-
iments, nor the conclusions of Proposition 5 will generalize to real market settings. In the marketplace, it is likely
that gains from trade among those who participate in the market are positive. In that case, sellers will expect to sell,
and the buyers to buy, which reverses the gap between the buying and selling price.
305 Hedonic Dimensions
A centralpart of our model is the set of consumption dimensions on which gain-lossutilityis deﬁned.
Because our theory (or any theory) of reference dependence would make very bad predictions in
some situations if applied literally to physical consumption dimensions, in this section we clarify
how best to think of these dimensions. To illustrate the problem, consider a decisionmaker making
choices over Tropicana and Florida’s Natural premium orange juices, two separate consumption
goods she really enjoys but can barely distinguish by taste or nutritional content. Would she be
willing to trade six ounces of Tropicana juice she had expected to consume for eight ounces of
Florida’s Natural juice? If the trade were coded as a loss in the Tropicana dimension and a gain in
the Florida’s Natural dimension, under usual parametrizations our model predicts she would not.
If the person does not care what kind of orange juice she consumes, however, she would pre-
sumably accept the trade. Psychologically, it is likely that the two brands would be treated as a
single dimension in gain-loss utility, so that the trade would be assessed as a gain of two ounces of
premium orange juice. More generally, most consumption goods are mixtures of diﬀerent hedonic
attributes which could be subject to gain-loss eﬀects. Orange and grapefruit juices may satisfy a
person’s thirst to the same extent, but she may ﬁnd their taste quite diﬀerent. Hence, giving up
orange juice that she expected to receive for grapefruit juice would not generate a loss or gain in
terms of satisfying thirst, but would generate a loss in terms of orange taste and a gain in terms of
grapefruit taste. Hence, a full account of the consumer’s choice includes breaking up this two-good
choice into a three-dimensional decision, consisting of assessing outcomes in terms of orangeness,
grapefruitness, and juiciness. Reconceptualizing the choice thusly would not aﬀect standard con-
sumer theory—all that matters is the net utilities for the two goods—but very much aﬀects the
predictions of any theory of reference dependence where the dimensions used to evaluate outcomes
are treated separately.
These examples suggest that the appropriate way to think about our model is to assume that
decisionmakers evaluate gains and losses over hedonic dimensions. That is, we can take any K-
dimensional consumption decision and re-write it as an H-dimensional choice problem by positing
that a vector of the K goods yields a vector of consumption levels in the H hedonic dimensions.
31This rewriting allows diﬀerent kinds of orange juice to be treated as a single dimension, as well
as a single good to aﬀect more than one hedonic dimension. Once transformed, the model of the
previous sections can be applied directly.31
The relevant hedonic dimensions can be related to the original dimensions in many ways. It
could be, for instance, that a person’s preferences over peanut butter, jelly, and bread are deter-
mined solely by the number of peanut butter and jelly sandwiches produced. We would then want
to translate the levels of the dimensions (p,j,b) into a single dimension c1 ≡ Min[p,j,b]. If the
consumer also cares about a “calorie dimension”, a second hedonic dimension of c2 ≡ p + j + b
could be added.
In this framework, two goods that are perfect substitutes in the classical sense—meaning that
the marginal utility from consuming one does not depend on the consumption level of the other—
may or may not be considered substitutes when assessing gains and losses of combinations of these
goods. The extent to which they are integrated depends on the extent to which a person considers
their consumption to be hedonically similar experiences. To illustrate this, suppose a moviegoer’s
utility from any given ﬁlm depends on how it contributes to each of four hedonic dimensions:
acting, plot, cinematography, and music. If she cares equally about the four dimensions, and
has utility from money, as well, then her consumption utility for a given movie can be given by
m(c)=c1 + c2 + c3 + c4 + c5.
Now suppose that Movies A and B each provide one unit of consumption in two of the rele-
vant hedonic dimensions, and zero units of consumption in the other two. Movies A and B are
then perfect substitutes in the classical sense. But “gain-loss substitutability”, as reﬂected in the
consumer’s willingness to trade oﬀ one for the other, when she was expecting to consume exactly
one of them, also depends on whether the movies provide utility in the same hedonic dimensions.
Suppose Movie A provides positive consumption in the acting and cinematography dimensions, and
that the decisionmaker is expecting to watch Movie A at price pA (so cA =( 1 ,1,0,0,−pA)), but
(unexpectedly to her) she gets an opportunity to switch to Movie B at price pB. What pB would
31Note that H may be bigger or smaller than K. In the case of diﬀerent kinds of orange juice, K = 2 and H =1 ;
in the case of orange juice vs. grapefruit juice, K = 2 and H =3 .
32induce a switch for the moviegoer? If cB =( 1 ,1,0,0,−pB), the consumer will prefer Movie B if it
is cheaper, no matter how little the diﬀerence in price. If the two movies diﬀer in one dimension,
however, with cB =( 0 ,1,1,0,−pB), then p0
B <p A would be needed to induce a switch; if they
diﬀer in two dimensions, with cB =( 0 ,0,1,1,−pB), a yet lower price p00
B <p 0
B would be needed.32
The premise that the relevant hedonic dimensions may diﬀer from goods dimensions means that
substantive psychological assumptions about these dimensions are needed in applying our model.
This conceptual indeterminacy in translating consumption utility into a full speciﬁcation of utility
is one of the biggest caveats to our claim in the introduction that we prescribe a fully-determined
way to translate any classical model into a reference-dependent one.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that this last statement is (merely) about the ability to
derive our model from a reference-independent one where researchers believe they already know the
appropriate consumption utility functions. In any environment where expectations by consumers
can be measured, inferred, or induced, standard revealed-preference analysis of the type used
ubiquitously in “reference-independent economics” can be used to fully identify utility functions
u(c|r).
Indeed, because behavior depends on which hedonic dimensions a person considers as separate,
revealed-preference analysis can also be used to directly identify hedonic dimensions. In particular,
the above analysis of the consumer’s willingness to switch between two consumption subsitutes
provides a way to determine—at least in principle—whether she considers two dimensions as he-
donically separate. Suppose we start from a “maximal” set H0 of dimensions of experience that
a person might plausibly care separately about. Then, there is a simple procedure to extract,
from the consumer’s behavior, whether h1,h 2 ∈ H0 should be speciﬁed as separate dimensions in
gain-loss utility. First, notice that we can ﬁnd consumption vectors c1 and c2 that give rise to the
same consumption utility, and that only diﬀer in dimensions h1 and h2: we promise a person zero
consumption in all dimensions, and then oﬀer her various choices that diﬀer only in dimensions
h1 and h2, until we pin down a pair of vectors she is indiﬀerent between.33 Then, we promise the
32More precisely, p
0
B solves pA − p
0
B + µ(pA − p
0
B)=−µ(−1) − µ(1) and p
00
B solves pA − p
00




33With rational expectations, it is of course impossible to literally surprise the agent in this way. But just as
33person the consumption vector c1, and then oﬀer her the opportunity to exchange it for c2 and a
little bit of money. If she refuses the exchange, h1 and h2 are truly separate hedonic dimensions.
If she accepts, they are not. Repeating this procedure, we obtain a partition of H0, where each
member of the partition is revealed to be a set of hedonically inseparable dimensions. The partition
should be used as the basis of the reference-dependent model.34
Of course, any re-writing of the dimensions should preserve the substantive consumption utility
(as opposed to gain-loss utility) of the original formulation, and to apply our model, we need to
maintain the linear separability of the dimensions. It is here, however, that we posit the psycholog-
ical hypothesis that the dimensions by which people assess gains and losses are indeed separable.
That is, if a person’s utility for goods x and y is not additively separable, then she will not assess
gains and losses separately in terms of those goods. Psychologically, the very reason that x and y
are not separable in consumption utility is that there is a hedonic dimension to which both con-
tribute in some way. A left shoe is a complement to a right shoe because both are necessary to the
experience of having a pair of shoes to wear, which is what a consumer cares about in the end. And
a Chinese meal is a partial substitute to an Italian meal because both can satisfy a person’s need
to be satiated; that the utility from eating one meal depends inseparably on the total number of
meals is an indicator in our interpretation that calorie intake needs to be considered as a separate
dimension in gain-loss evaluation.
We believe it is transparent that any plausible general model of reference-dependent preferences
must be deﬁned with respect to dimensions that treat hedonically similar experiences as single
dimensions. More speculatively, we conjecture that there are also circumstances that are best
conceptualized by assuming that even hedonically initially distinct dimensions become similar for
the decisionmaker in evaluating gain-loss utility. Consider a consumer who, over a long period of
discussed in Section 3, we can get “arbitrarily close.” Here, an agent can be told that she will have zero consumption
in all dimensions with probability 1 − ￿, and be able to choose with very low probability ￿.
34It bears emphasizing, however, that the identiﬁcation of the relevant hedonic dimensions are merely means of
predicting which consumption goods are complete or partial “gain-loss substitutes” as reﬂected in the function u(c|r),
and of psychologically interpreting this function. Once u(c|r) is empirically identiﬁed, our model is fully speciﬁed,
with no further assumptions about the relevant hedonic dimensions needed for analysis.
34time, randomly either plays basketball or goes out on Friday night. Although these two experiences
are intitially clearly separate hedonically, we hypothesize that the consumer’s experience in trading
them oﬀ leads to their integration. That is, after a while the consumer gets used to having her
losses in one activity being oﬀset by gains in the other, to the extent that she does not experience
giving up one for the other as a loss.35
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Our goal in this paper was to put forward a fully speciﬁed model of reference-dependent preferences
that can accommodate existing evidence and, most importantly, be applied to a wide range of
economic situations. The centerpiece of our model is the proposal that a person’s reference point
is her recent probabilistic beliefs about the outcomes she is going to get. Thus, for example, if
she expects improvements in her circumstances, and these changes fail to occur, she experiences a
painful sensation of loss, even if she has retained or improved on her status quo. Indeed, our model
provides an avenue to study an intuition about the strong role that expectations play in employee
satisfaction with wages; it predicts both a status quo bias in stagnant environments, and a taste
for improvement in environments where workers have become accustomed to improvement.36
By assuming rational expectations, our theory fully endogenizes the determination of reference
points. In fact (with the important caveat that applying our theory requires a modeler to correctly
specify the dimensions over which gain-loss utility is deﬁned) we have provided a way to translate
a classical model into a reference-dependent one, and demonstrated such applicability in consumer
behavior. Since the theory emphasizes the malleability and endogenously determined nature of
35In general, the integration of diﬀerent hedonic dimensions due to experience with trading them oﬀ may be an
important phenomenon in any consumer society: as savvy consumers, we are used to getting the best possible deal
each time, and thus to trade oﬀ goods we might have expected buying but are not available cheaply with those we
might not have expected to get but are selling at a bargain.
36On a larger scale, this idea is consistent with Davies’s (1962) inﬂuential theory of political revolutions. Davies
claims that revolutions invariably occur when people have come to expect improvements in conditions, and an
economic downturn occurs. An “intolerable gap” then develops between the changes that the people expect and
what they actually get.
35valuations for consumption goods, it is a fruitful arena in which to study competition between
ﬁrms and psychological aspects of sales techniques (such as the low-balling of car buyers mentioned
above), marketing, and advertising.37
There are some important economic situations to which the current version of our model does
not apply, but to which we believe alternative models using similar principles would apply. As
we have stressed, the psychological hypothesis behind our formulation is that a person’s reference
point, and thus her preferences over consumption outcomes, depend on lagged expectations. As
a consequence, when the person makes her consumption decision, she treats the reference point
as ﬁxed, giving rise to our personal-equilibrium concept. In some important economic situations,
however, a considerable amount of time passes between the person’s decision and the time of con-
sumption. In these situations, the reference point to which consumption is eventually compared
will presumably be based on the decision made; insofar as the decisionmaker anticipates this, she
would not treat the reference point as ﬁxed. A good example for this kind of decision problem is the
purchase of extended warranties and other types of insurance: whether or not a good breaks is typ-
ically realized long after the decision. Incorporating such possibilities into a rational-expectations
model requires a modiﬁcation of our theory that allows a person’s reference point to be determined
after her decision. In its current form, therefore, our model is applicable mostly to situations where
the decision leads relatively quickly to consumption.
Finally, because our framework assumes fully rational utility maximization, it does not incor-
porate two aspects of loss aversion that evidence strongly suggests are important. First, we have
not seriously confronted issues of how a person conceptualizes a given decision problem, and, in
particular, which future, contemporaneous, or potential decisions she takes into consideration when
thinking about the current one. While all economic models are sensitive to assumptions regarding
such “choice bracketing,” the issue is especially acute in models such as ours. What other decisions
37We also suspect that our model may help intepret, improve, and bring into economic analysis the vast marketing
literature on two topics: Brand loyalty (see, e.g., Aaker 1991,1995) and reference-price eﬀects (see., e.g., Bidwell,
Wang, and Zona (1995) and Putler (1992)). While—especially in understanding brand loyalty—other factors seem
important, these two phenomena are plausibly related to the role of reference points in both purchases of goods and
the prices paid.
36a person considers as integral to the current one will aﬀect our prediction about what she considers
to be gains and losses.38 Substantial evidence indicates that people narrowly bracket—they do not
integrate decisions at hand with other ones, even when it is clear that they would increase their
utility by doing so. One cannot fully understand reference-dependent preferences without under-
standing these bracketing phenomena.39 Second, there is also evidence that the observed degree of
loss aversion does reﬂect true reference-level eﬀects on well-being, but involves misprediction about
those eﬀects. One does feel a little loss at losing a mug. That, by all intuition and evidence, is a real
hedonic experience, and making choices reﬂecting that real hedonic experience is partly rational.
But as interpreted by Kahneman (2001) and Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003), people
seem to over-attend to this experience because they ignore that the sensation of loss will pass very
quickly—behaving as if they would spend much time longing for the mug they once had.40 On both
of these accounts, the nature and scope of reference-dependent choices seems to reﬂect mistakes.
Therefore, our model—which assumes rational utility maximation—is incomplete in describing the
implications of reference dependence, especially when welfare concerns are involved.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
1. Obvious.
2. Suppose not; that is, suppose u(c,c0) ≥ u(c0,c 0) and u(c,c) ≤ u(c0,c). Adding these and
38For example, if she completely isolates a purchase decision from others, not buying after expecting to do so
necessarily feels like a loss. But if she brackets broadly, she would consider the possibility of “making up” for the loss
with other purchases.
39For discussions of choice bracketing in various contexts, see, e.g., Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Benartzi and
Thaler (1995), and Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999).
40This form of misprediction leads to one way we believe our model over-states the connection beetween between
consumption and gain-loss utility. Items that are subject to misprediction about attachment are likely to exhibit a
higher gain-loss to consumption utility ratio than those items (e.g., paper clips, toilet paper, or a household furnace)
whose purpose is suﬃciently utilitarian that people neither become strongly attached to them, nor mispredict their
future utility for them.
37using the deﬁnition of u implies that
m(c)+m(c0)+n(c|c0)+n(c0|c) ≥ m(c)+m(c0)+n(c|c)+n(c0|c0). (11)









By A2, and using that c 6= c0, this is a contradiction.
3. We prove that for any F,F0 ∈ ∆(RK),
U(F|F)+U(F0|F0) ≥ U(F|F0)+U(F0|F).
This is obviously suﬃcient to establish the claim by contradiction. Furthermore, we prove that the
above is true dimension by dimension. Let the marginals of F and F0 on dimension k be Fk and
F0
k, respectively. Noticing that expected consumption utilities are the same on the two sides, we














Since µ satisﬁes A30, for any x ≥ 0 we have µ(x)+µ(−x)=−αx for some α>0. Using this and















We can give a geometric interpretation to this inequality. The inequality says that the expected
distance (measured according to the utility function mk) between two points chosen randomly
according to Fk plus the expected distance between two points chosen randomly according to F0
k
is less than twice the expected distance between a point chosen randomly according to Fk and a
point chosen randomly according to F0
k.
38Consider any point x on the real line. Let Fk(x)=p and F0
k(x)=p0. The probabilitythat mk(x)
is on a line segment of two points mk(ck) and mk(rk), where ck and rk are chosen independently
according to Fk is 2p(1− p). Similarly, the probability that it is between two such points when ck
and rk are chosen according to F0
k is p0(1 − p0). And the probability that it is between two such
points when ck and rk are chosen according to Fk and F0
k, respectively, is p(1 − p0)+p0(1 − p). It
is suﬃcient to prove that
p(1− p)+p0(1 − p0) ≤ p(1− p0)+p0(1 − p),
which is true since (p− p0)2 ≥ 0. Furthermore, if there is any x such that Fk(x) 6= F0
k(x), then the
inequality 13 is strict. 2

















A0 and A1 are obviously satisﬁed. Notice that for any y>x>0,
vk(−y)+vk(y)=µ(mk(y)− mk(0))+ µ(−(mk(y)− mk(0)))
<µ (mk(x)− mk(0))+ µ(−(mk(x)− mk(0))) = vk(−x)+vk(x)























This completes the proof. 2
39Proof of Proposition 3. We can put B(pr) in the following form:
B(pr)=1− pr − ηλ
Z pr
0







We prove that if f(pr) ≤
1+ηλ
η(λ−1)(pmax+1), then B(pr) has exactly one zero. First, expression 14 is
positive for pr = 0, and negative for a suﬃciently large pr,s oB(pr) has at least one zero.
To prove that B(pr) has exactly one zero, notice that it is negative for any pr >p max.N o w
B0(pr)=−1 − ηλ+ η(λ − 1)(pr +1 ) f(pr), which, by the condition on f(pr), is negative for any
pr <p max. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Let BF(pr) be deﬁned by Equation 8 when the distribution of prices is F,
and let BF 0(pr) be deﬁned similarlyfor F0. Under conditions of Part 1 of the Theorem, BF 0(p∗
r) < 0.
Since BF 0(0) > 0 and BF 0(pr) is continuous, there is a p∗∗
r <p ∗
r such that BF 0(p∗∗
r ) = 0. Similarly,
under the conditions of part of the Theorem, BF 0(p∗
r) > 0. Since limpr→∞ BF 0(pr) < 0 and BF 0(pr)
is continuous, there is a p∗∗
r >p ∗
r satisfying BF 0(p∗∗
r )=0 .2
Proof of Proposition 5. From the analysis in the text,
S(pr) − B(pr)=ηF(pr)(λ− 1)(pr − E[p|p<p r]) ≥ 0,
and the inequalityis strictif F(pr) > 0. Combined withS(0),B(0) > 0, and limpr→∞ S(pr),limpr→∞ B(pr)=
−∞, this implies the statement of the theorem. 2
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